Water
is a global common, the management of which may require the implementation of International
Environmental Agreements (IEAs). For
example, conflict between, China, India and Bangladesh over the presence of
Chinese dams in the Yarlung
Zangbo river of Tibet,
not far upstream from where it passes into India and
eventually Bangladesh as the Brahmaputra, are ongoing. China is the source of 10 major rivers
flowing to 11 countries and is also the world's foremost builder of hydropower
dams. Naturally, China’s neighbors fear that it may exploit its power. Issues
such as this can be effectively overcome by the employment of IEAs. Thus it is important to further understand exactly what IEAs are and
look into what makes them successful.
Comparing and contrasting two famous
IEAs (Kyoto and Montreal) may help us to establish whether IEAs can be
successful and under what conditions they are effective.
Montreal
Protocol-
Implemented
in 1987, the Montreal protocol was designed for the regulation of CFC’s that
lead to ozone depletion. Here quantitative
emissions limits for industrial, transitional and developing countries were put
in place. A scheme in which Industrial countries pay for added costs to
developing countries was enforced. Trade sanctions were introduced for
non-participants and violators. The Initial protocol was modest, gradually
tightening over a 10-year period.
UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change-
By
contrast to the Montreal protocol the Kyoto protocol (1997) defines mandatory
emissions reduction for Annex I (developed) countries that sign up. With a goal
of emissions reduction over a 15-year period, in which developed countries are
largely exempted. Penalties for non-compliance were not implemented.
Flexibility
mechanisms that were introduced for implementation to promote savings include:
·
Emissions trading
·
Joint implementation i.e. industrialized nations could obtain
emissions credits from carbon sinks (in their own country or created abroad)
·
Clean development mechanisms e.g. industrialized nations could obtain
emissions credits by say constructing efficient power plant in a developing
country
Why
was Kyoto a failure?
The
Kyoto protocol was introduced during the Brazil Earth Summit (1992) however was
only finalized in 1997, half way through its 10-year life, making goals somewhat
unachievable. Furthermore, it was signed
but never ratified by the US, who are the largest gross emitter and largest
emitter per capita of CO2 in the world, without the United States, the treaty
cannot be as successful. One reason the
United States refuses to ratify is due to the absence of binding targets for
developing nations, without which targets will not be reached- figures show
that between 1992 and 2007 the changes in greenhouse emissions are as follows: India+103%,
China+150%, US+20%, Russian federation -20%, Japan +11%. The Kyoto protocol ignored many essential characteristics needed in
designing an effective International Environmental Agreement of which most were
included in the Montreal protocol.
What
makes Montreal a success?
It
is widely thought that the Montreal protocol was one of the most successful
treaties ever negotiated and implemented. With all 142 developing countries able to meet the 100%
phase-out mark for CFCs, halons and other ozone depleting substances in 2010. The ozone layer is expected to
return to 1980levels between 2045 and 2060 as long as all countries continue
to meet their obligations.
Comparison
of Montreal and Kyoto Protocols
|
Montreal
|
Kyoto
|
Developing country reductions?
|
YES
|
NO
|
Permanent?
|
YES
|
NO
|
Emissions trading?
|
NO
|
YES
|
Side payments?
|
YES
|
NO
|
Participant incentives?
|
YES
|
NO
|
Leakage prevention?
|
YES
|
NO
|
So
what makes a successful IEA?
Barrett
(2004) reviewed over 190 IEAs and drew the following conclusions on creating a
successful and effective IEA:
- · It is necessary to create an aggregate net benefit to participants, and show that overall gross benefits outweigh overall gross costs.
- · To distribute the aggregate gain among participants, for each participant the benefits should outweigh the costs.
- · Allowing extra “side-payments” if parties differ makes participating worthwhile for everyone.
- · To allow the distribution of benefits of cooperation to take many forms, for example direct cash transfers, and trade schemes etc.
- · To provide incentives for abatement cost savings, as international solutions would most likely be highly costly to implement in terms of enforcement and monitoring.
- · Market mechanisms including emissions fees, trading emission fees, trading schemes can promote cost savings and give incentives for R&D investment.
- · Emissions trading
- · Joint implementation i.e. industrialized nations could obtain emissions credits from carbon sinks (in their own country or created abroad
- · Clean development mechanisms e.g. industrialized nations could obtain emissions credits by say constructing efficient power plant in a developing country.
Furthermore,
Sandler (2004) found that international collective action was more likely to
succeed where:
- There was sufficient mutual self-interest
- In response to recognition of a shared threat for example increased co-operation on counter-terrorism in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
- Where there was leadership by a dominant nation for example the role of the USA in securing agreement to protect the ozone layer.
With
this in mind, my next post will look at the recent Budapest Water Summit, and
aim to evaluate it’s success as an IEA., as well as looking into it’s policies.
What does the literature say on Copenhagen being seen as a relative failure too?
ReplyDeleteThe Copenhagen Accord failed to achieve a binding agreement for long-term action. Only a non-binding ‘political accord’ was agreed between 25 parties. This lack of legally binding commitments for reducing CO2 emissions largely (and in my opinion justifiably) suggests the summit’s failure. Potential reasons for the failure include:
Delete• Lack of communication and negotiation between key governments- The close of the summit saw very little international cooperation and negotiation and more last-minute deals organized in back rooms between leaders of the US and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China).
• US lack luster commitment- Obama had only been in office for a year, and was also at the helm of major healthcare reforms. If the Copenhagen summit had been a year later maybe the US would have been able to indicate plans for further action in the future- indications that might have encouraged other countries to increase their own offers.
• Failure on the front of the host nation- Before the summit began, Lars Lokke Rasmussen’s office produced a draft political declaration sent to a select group of "important countries" thereby irritating every country not on the list, including most of those seriously vulnerable to climate impacts. Furthermore, Thomas Becker, the principal Danish negotiator was sacked weeks before the summit with reports of a huge rift between Mr Rasmussen's office and the climate department. Thus any trust that developing country negotiators had established with Mr Becker was thwarted.
• Some blame was even placed on developed countries with The Australian Broadcasting Corporation commenting that India, China and other emerging nations cooperated at Copenhagen to hinder attempts at forming legally binding targets for carbon emissions, in order to protect their economic growth! Ed Miliband accused China specifically of sinking an agreement.
However, some people do see the summit, despite it’s lack of legally binding commitments, as a crucial step towards decreasing greenhouse gas emissions. Personally, I see it as a failure.
Here’s a pretty interesting paper on psycho-social disorder related to the failure of Copenhagen.
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CFQQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fepress.lib.uts.edu.au%2Fojs%2Findex.php%2Fportal%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F1757%2F2613&ei=CvuBUobdJq6W0QWk7oCABA&usg=AFQjCNHdTr4-TX2lkXIpeWZUWS2tET8Crw&sig2=wGgjorb-ZBWWVrhouOTA5Q